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Abstract 
Our model shows that firm's debt-equity ratio decreases with R&D investment returns, firms' R&D 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There is a set of stylized empirical facts that links RBD investment and firm 
financial structure. Goodacre et al. (1995) survey the main empirical findings 
on this topic. First, there is a negative relationship between leverage and RBD 
activity (e.g. Long et al. 1985). Second, debt-equity ratio is lower for small 
undiversified firms specialized on RBD investment than for diversified firms in 
less intensive RBD sectors (e.g. Hall 1992 and Goodacre et al. 1995). Third, 
small firms in high-tech industries use mainly internal funds to finance their RBD 
investment (e.g. Hao et al. 1990 and Himmelberg et al. 199.1). Moreover, the last 
authors also show that among outside financing instruments, these firms prefer 
equity to debt (low debt-equity ratio). 
\Ve build up a two-period theoretical model based on three assumptions; the 
existence of limited liability, the non-verifiability of Rt.fD returns as well as firm 
cash flow, and most importantly, the superior rhythm at , .... hich R&D-specialized 
firms convert their ReD investment returns in knowledge production. Rapoport 
(1971) finds that in RBD intensive sectors like electronics, the RBD gestation 
lag to incorporate R€3D expenditures in knowledge production is 2.5 times lower 
than that of less R€3D intensive sectors like machinery. 
The previous three assumptions allow us to reproduce the empirical findings 
referred above. Limited liability defines an upper limit to firm debt payments. 
As firm's profits increase on RBD returns, we obtain in this way a decreasing 
relationship between the firm relative leverage (debt-equity ratio) and the RBD 
returns. Second, as firms become more focused on R€3D investment, the losses 
for the entrepreneur are low if he triggers a short-term financier liquidation by 
not attending the debt obligations. This is the case when the firm has already 
assimilated a substantial amonnt of the RBD returns in the initial period. To 
prevent this behavior, the financier reduces the firm debt payments. The final re-
sult is an overall reduction in the firm's debt-equity ratio. Finally, concerning the 
availability of internal funds, the higher they are, the lower the need of external 
funds is, and the lower the firm debt payment obligations. 
The novelty of our model is to provide a theoretical background to the previous 
empirical findings, not assuming a low collateral that RBD-specialized firms can 
offer to obtain debt financing, but looking at the differential rhythm at which 
these firms assimilate their Rt.{D investment returns. \Ve think this is relevant 
because in a dynamic context each assumption has different effects in the evolution 
of the debt-equity ratio for RBD-specialized firms. As these firms improve their 
efficiency, and consequently their reputation as time goes on, they can offer an 
increasing real collateral guarantee to potential lenders. This leads to a rise of 
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firms' debt-equity ratio. On the other hand, firms' efficiency improvements are 
translated into reductions of their Rf3D gestation lag. This diminishes firms' 
debt-equity ratio according to our model. 
We use a model formally similar to Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), although 
we address a completely different question. Their focus is on the optimal number 
of creditors to prevent the entrepreneur opportunistic behavior linked to the non-
verifiability of firm cash flows. 
Within the formal setting designed, some other results are obtained. In par-
ticular, we prove that debt length has to be lower for Rf3D-specialized firms. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we define and solve 
the model, while in Section 3 we discuss the results and present some conclusions 
2. THE l\!IODEL 
We consider a two-period model, where a risk-neutral firm borrows external funds 
lE from a competitive credit market to finance a project which requires a layout 
of I = le + d units, where d is the value of the firm's internal funds. A firm with 
a high d (low le) is said to have follO\ved a deep pocket policy. 
The project lasts for two periods and involves some Rf3D investment. The 
returns of this project are of two types: a deterministic non-liquid return El, 
and a cash flow Y, received at the end of the first period with probability p. Both 
are assumed to be non-verifiable. E measures benefits generated by the Rf3D 
investment such as human and physical capital accumulation. A part f3E of this 
return is generated at the end of the first period, and the rest accrues at the end 
of the second period. Thus f3 measures the speed of Rf3D assimilation, and a 
high {3 will be meant to characterize Rf3D-intensive firms. 
'Ve consider a contract {R, o:}, where R is the payment made by the firm to the 
financier at the end of the first period, and 0: is the probability that the financier 
decides to liquidate the project conditional on the fact that the entrepreneur 
does not pay R 2. The financier obtains a rent L from liquidation. Rf3D benefits 
are assumed to be relatively high so that a first-best solution would involve no 
liquidation (L < (1-{3}E). The contract cannot specify second-period payments, 
as E is not verifiable and the entrepreneur has no resources once the project has 
been undertaken. Thus, an ex-post renegotiation between the financier and the 
1 A non-deterministic E would have not changed our main findings 
2 This kind of contract. (a. la Bolton Scharfstein) can be ex-post implement.able if, there is a 
referee (a venture capitalist, for example) who determines, consistently with n, the decision of 
liquidation. Venture capitalists are intermediaries between lenders and R&D-specialized firms 
(star-up firms) whose activity is based on their reputation of not behaving opportunistically 
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entrepreneur is not possible. The optimal contract trades off the cost of an 
increase in a, due to inefficient liquidation, against the benefit of preventing the 
entrepreneur to cheat over cash flow Y. \Ve solve the first-best problem: 
M ax 1I"{O~Q~1,R} = p(Y -R+E)+(l-p)[l-a(l-J3)]E-d (1) 
S.t. pR+ (1- p)aL - lE = 0 (2) 
S.t. 0 ::; R ::; Y (3) 
S.t. Y-R+E~Y+a!3E+(l-a)E (4) 
Expression (1) of entrepreneur expected profits (11") coincides with the social utility 
due to the financier's zero-profit condition of equation (2), (3) is the limited 
liability constraint, and (4) is a truth-telling constraint. 
We assume project feasibility, that is, 11" ~ 0 and financier's profits to be zero 
for 0 ::; a ::; 1. In the Lemma, we precise feasibility conditions. 
From (4), we get a ~ (l-~)E' and we can distinguish two situations: 
al If Y ~ Y (with Y being a lmver bound as defined below) the limited 
liability constraint R ::; Y is not binding for the optimal R. Thus, given that the 
entrepreneur profits, IT, are decreasing in a, we will have a = (l-~)E' Substituting 
this value of a into the finan.cier's zer~profit condition (2), we find: 
R[P(l- !3)E + (1- p)L]- lE(l- !3)E = 0 => R = P(l!~~~~i~p)L (5) 
1\'1 k' eT f (4)' d fi Y - IE(l-13)E 
lV a mo use 0 , we can e ne = p(l-13)E+(l-p)L 
bl If Y < Y the firm is liquidity-constrained, that is, its project cash flow 
is entirely exhausted attending debt payments. In that case the limited liability 
condition is binding (R = Y) for a = (l-~)E' Thus, a > (l-~)E for sure. We 
compute this value using the financier's zero-profit condition: 
pY +(l-p)o:L-lE = 0 => 0: = [f:J)~ 3 (6) 
Lemma 
The project is fea.5ible if Y > Y = ~{lE - (l~)E(E - d)} and lE ::; pR + 
(1 - p) L, with R given below. In that case, the optimal contract {R, o:} becomes: 
- If Y ::; Y < Y == p(l!~~~~i~p)L ' R = Y and a = [f:pl~ 
- - R 
- If Y ~ Y , then R= Y and a = (l-13)E 
At this stage, we can compute the firm's debt-equity ratio DE = R11I", where 11" 
are the firm's profits (11" = p(Y - R + E) + (1 - p)[l - a(l - !3)]E) 4. Using the 
3 Condition Y :::; Y, ensures 0 ;::: 0 
4 This is a flow measure, not a stock measure. l'vloreover, within our setting, 7f depends on 
some intangible assets like E (knowledge production). The point is that firms' books generally 
do not estimate the value of the non-verifiable R&D returns E. In this sense any empirical 
implementation of our model should be aware of these shortcomings. 
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Lemma, we obtain the follO\ving expression for the feasible projects (Y > Y): 
DE = E[LiJ-i3)(IE-PY)] if Y < Y 
{ 
YL -
ifY ~ Y pY+E-Y 
(7) 
Making use of (7) and the lemma, the following comparative statics are obtained: 
Proposition 
If the project is feasible, then: 
- The debt-equity ratio DE is decreasing in d and (3. Moreover, 
If Y < Y then af/l < 0 
If Y > Y then af?l > «) 0 if E < (» E = J(I~~~Y 
- Debt length (which is inversely related with 0), is increasing in E, d, and 
L and decreasing in (3 for Y > Y. For liquidity-constrained firms (Y < Y) debt 
length is constant with respect to E and (3, and is increasing in Land d. 
Proof 
By differentiation making use of L < (1 - (3)E and that pY ::; h for Y ::; Y 
3. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our model shows that leverage is negatively related to Rf3D returns (E). This 
is strictly true for all financially-constrained firms (Y < Y) and for those uncon-
strained firms which have high returns to Rf3D. The assumption of firms' cash 
flow (Y) and E to be non verifiable, prevents lenders from forcing an ex-post 
renegotiation with the entrepreneur and extracting rents from potential increases 
in E by charging higher debt payments (R). The result is that firms' profits 
rise with E more than R. This is especially true for high values of E, and for 
liquidity-constrained firms, where the limited liability condition is binding, and 
R is independent of E. Thus, we find a low debt-equity ratio for high values 
of E. This is in accordance with the first type of empirical findings referred to in 
the introduction. Second, for those firms specialized on Rf3D activities, that is, 
those which generate a high proportion of Rf3D returns in the short-term (high 
(3), we obtain a low debt-equity ratio. The higher (3 is, the lower the maximum 
rents lying over Y the entrepreneur can lose (( 1 - (3) E). To prevent this fact, 
the financier, reduces entrepreneur's costs of telling the true Y by reducing debt 
payments (R). Together with the positive relationship between firms' profits and 
Rf3D specialization ((3), this produces a negative relationship between specializa-
tion in Rf3D and the debt-equity ratio. This is consistent with the second type 
of empirical evidence referred to in the introduction, where young non-diversified 
firms focused on Rf3D activities, present a 100ver debt-equity ratio than old firms 
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in more mature sectors. Third, there is a trivial negative relationship between 
firms' debt-equity ratio and the amount of internal funds available. This result 
is consistent with the second and the third type of empirical evidence mentioned 
in the introduction: small firms in high-tech industries that use basically inter-
nal funds to finance their activities, present low debt-equity ratios. Finally, we 
have found that debt length diminishes in two cases: when the project has a 
small liquidation value (specific assets); and when the entrepreneur's incentives 
to behave dishonestly are high (i. e. (3 is high, external funding le is large, or in-
terestingly R€1D returns E are low). Thus under the optimal contract, E acts as 
a disciplinary mechanism which prevents the entrepreneur from behaving oppor-
tunistically: the benefits the entrepreneur may lose if he lies, (1 - (3) E, increase 
with E. This would explain why in the presence of high returns to R€1D the 
lender would like to offer long-term debt. 
Finally in a dynamic context, as R€1D-specialized firms become more efficient 
by reducing their Rt<iD gestation lag, we predict a decreasing evolution of the 
debt-equity ratio for these firms. Future empirical work would have to test these 
predictions. 
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APPENDIX 
For the Lemma, the only point \vhich is worth to mention is that condition lE ~ pR+ (1 - p)L ensures financier's profits pR + (1 - p)o:L -lE = 0 for 0: ~ 1, 
otherwise, this condition could only be achieved for 0: > 1, which does not make 
sense. Note that for Y < Y => 0: = ~f~)~ ~ 1 if lE ~ pR + (1 - p)L (as R = Y). 
On the other hand, for Y > Y => 0: = p(l-;3)l'?t(I-p)L :::; 1 if le :::; pR + (1 - p)L (as R = 0:(1 - {3)E). 
For the Proposition, we provide the derivation of those non-trivial derivatives: 
-With regard to the derivatives of DE for Y < Y, all are trivial once we note th t I Y 0 f Y Y - lE (I-;3)E - lE..{ 1 } lE. a E - P > or < - p(l-;3)E+(l-p)L - p l+(~-l)(l_~)E < P 
- For the derivatives of DE for Y ~ Y, we compute the following ones: 
aDE 
a;3 
pY~E dY ~{ Y } - ~{ I } - y dji < 0 where we have used the fact a;3 pY+E-Y - 8;3 p)~E_1 - [p\2E_I]2 y y 
that: 
dY _ .!L{ IE(I-;3)E } -.lL { Is } _ d;3 - d;3 p(l-;3)E+(I-p)L - d;3s p+~ -(1-!3)E 
aDE 
aE 
\Ve first compute the following derivative: 
I ( (! -pJL )(1 13) ~ dY _ -.!L{ lE (1-8)E } _ -.!L{ h: } _ E (I-!3) E2 - _ y(l. «(I-!3lE) ) = dE - dE p(l-;3)E+(I-p)L - dE +~ - (+~)2 - E +~ -P (1-!3)E P (1-!3)E P (l-!3)E 
_ly( 1 )T,V'tlF-((I-P)L) = E H$V Z 1 ; = (I-;3)E 
\Vith this expression, we can ensure: 
Y-(pY+E)(¥e) 
a { Y } a { I} .2 = _ Y-(pY+E)(~) _ aE pY +E- Y = aE p\:;E _ I = - (PSf}; _ 1)2 y2 (P1:;E _ 1)2 -
y2(~ _ 1)2 {(pY +E)iY(I~E. )-Y} = y2(~_1)2 {(pY +E)i(~ )-1} = y F Y F 
1 {(l+Ef) } y(p1:.:cE _ 1)2 HE. - 1 y F 
C 1 Y ~ 1 - (I-;3)E a { Y } ~ 0 onsequent y E < F = (1-p)L => ffE pY+E-Y < 
A y ~ 1 - (l-;3)E E~ /(l-p)LY - E h f b .. s E < F = (l-p)L ~ > V 1-;3 = ,t ere ore we 0 tam. 
aDE~O'f E~E= V(l-P)LY 8E < Z > 1-;3 
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